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emissions stemming from energy related activities or industrial processes. During bad times, 
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1. Introduction  
 
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and to the Great Recession that followed, reopened the 
policy discussion on the compatibility between economic growth and environmental sustainability. 
The fall in production as a result of the crisis, led to downward adjustments in consumption and 
investment patterns and, consequently, to reductions in energy consumption and, thus, carbon 
dioxide emissions.1 However, there was no significant change in the global temperature trend, on 
the contrary (Enkvist et al., 2010). More importantly, in contrast with the oil crises of the 1970s, 
the GFC did not lead to a structural change in the growth path of emissions in the recent recovery 
years (Peters et al., 2011).2 After a mild decline of 1.4 percent in 2009, in 2010 a 3 percent growth 
was already observed in global CO2 emissions, followed by 2.2 percent in 2012, and 2.3 percent 
in 2013 (The Global Carbon Project). Additionally, global carbon dioxide emissions reached an 
all-time high in 2011.3 This fact escalated the number of debates on how the GFC may had 
impacted climate change policies (Egenhoffer, 2008). On the one hand, falls in emissions often 
incite claims from climate sceptics that worries over global warming are overstated. On the other, 
a rise in emissions raises concerns among environmental groups that insufficient action is being 
deployed  to address the problem.4 In this context, the 2015 Paris climate accord – the so-called 
 
1 The assessment of the output-emissions decoupling hypothesis has been done by several authors (e.g. Kristrom and 
Lundgren (2005) for Sweden; Ajmi et al. (2015) for G7 countries; Doda (2014) for 81 countries; Cohen et al. (2018) 
for the top 20 emitters). Others have focused on the validity testing of the so-called Environmental Kuznets Curve—
see, e.g., Stern (2004) and Kaika and Zervas (2013). 
2 The authors compare this effect to the effect on emissions after the oil crises in 1973 and 1979 which led to a 
permanent shift from oil to natural gases and meant a decrease in emissions. In contrast, the Asian financial crisis also 
led to a drop in global CO2 emissions that lasted post-crisis as a result of economic and political changes. 
3 This relatively uncharacteristic bounce back in emissions can be attributed to: (1) the globally coordinated action of 
central banks and initial fiscal stimulus; (2) the immediate easing of energy prices reducing pressure for structural 
changes in energy consumption; (3) the continuing and accelerated increase in coal-fired power (IEA, 2013). 
4 For instance, a rise in German emissions in 2016 led to alarm in some circles that the country had “further dented” 




COP21 – was a landmark effort on the part of countries to set and monitor commitments to mitigate 
global warming.5 Later, the COP23 in 2017 in Bonn “sought to maintain the global momentum to 
decouple output from greenhouse gas emissions” (Gough, 2017).   
We empirically evaluate the impact of (financial) crises on emissions in a panel of 55 
emerging and low-income countries between 1980 and 2012. By means of Jorda’s (2005) local 
projection method, we estimate several impulse responses and trace the short to medium-term 
impact of crises on emissions. A perusal of the literature shows no such systematic and 
comprehensive study looking specifically at developing countries and exploring the nature of 
crises and types of emissions considered here. Our make several contributions to the literature.  
First, we inspect at the role played by different financial crises (systematic, non-systematic, 
banking, currency or debt) on a variety of emissions split either by sector of activity or gas nature. 
Moreover, we internalize the international trade component of emissions´ spillovers in addressing 
the crises-emissions relationship. International trade “gives a mechanism for consumers to shift 
environmental pollution to distant lands” (Peters and Hertwich, 2008). Jaunky (2011) notes that it 
is possible that although advanced countries “may have experienced a change in their production 
structure, their consumption structure remains unchanged”; hence, the decoupling may arise 
simply be because “dirty industries in developed countries tend to migrate” to developing 
countries.6 To account for this aspect, we differentiate between production-based and 
 
5 Leichenko et al. (2010) used the GFC as an example of the close linkage between globalization and climate change. 
Amann et al. (2009) provide estimates of greenhouse gas mitigation potentials and costs in different countries. They 
employ the IIASA’s Greenhouse gas-Air pollution Interactions and Synergies (GAINS) model. These types pf models 
have been applied before to identify cost-effective air pollution control strategies, and to study the co-benefits between 
greenhouse gas mitigation and air pollution control in Europe and Asia (Hordijk and Amann, 2007; Tuinstra, 2007). 
6 According to Giedraitis et al. (2010), the regional differences in the relationship between economic activity and CO2 
emissions can partly be explained by the different marginal costs of reducing pollution. For industrial intensive 
economies the marginal costs of pollution reduction are much higher than for service-oriented economies. Combining 
this with the displacement effect (Stern, 2004; Jaunky, 2011) advanced countries can more easily lower emissions by 




consumption-based greenhouse gases emissions, where the latter add in the emissions embodies 
in the net exports of countries. Second, we control for the prevailing macroeconomic and fiscal 
conditions at the time of the crisis in affecting the response of emissions. Third, we make use of 
recent econometric techniques with several advantages relative to alternative approaches. 
We find that financial crises result if a decrease of CO2 emissions. Moreover, systemic 
crises positively impact consumption-based emissions, suggesting that, on average, this type of 
crises encouraged the consumption of goods with an inferior environmental quality. A country that 
is hit by a debt crisis will experience an increase in emissions stemming from either energy related 
activities or industrial processes. Splitting the sample by income group, we find that, in normal 
times, financial (debt) crises lead to in a fall in CO2 (production-based GHG) emissions in 
emerging markets. For low-income countries, we observe a positive (negative) and statistically 
significant response of methane emissions following banking (currency) crises. In bad times, 
financial crises positively affect both methane and nitrous oxide emissions. In contrast, during 
periods of economic expansions, the effects tend to be negative but are most of the time 
imprecisely estimated. During periods of fiscal retrenchment, a financial crisis results in a fall in 
CO2 emissions. Finally, CO2 emissions respond positively (negatively) after a banking or debt 
crisis that takes place simultaneously with a loosening (tightening) of the fiscal stance. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes our 
data and Section 4 discusses the empirical approach. Section 5 presents our main results and the 







2. Literature Review  
 
The major greenhouse gas - carbon dioxide -  has been shown to move in tandem with the 
economy and to be strongly correlated with both GDP and energy consumption (Gierdraitis et al. 
(2010) and Lane (2011). The analysis of the 1870s and 1930s depressions by Giedraitis et al. 
(2010) and, more recently, by Stavytskyy et al. (2016) support the claim that economic crises are 
associated with lower CO2 emissions. Inspecting the Asian Financial Crisis, Siddiqi (2000) 
alluded to some positive consequences stemming from it to the global environment. York (2012) 
demonstrated that the response of emissions to an increase in income was greater during good 
times than during bad times. Sobrino and Monzon (2014) assessed the environmental effects of 
the Global Financial Crisis in Spain and found that it led to a fall of transport activity and to higher 
road energy efficiency. Declercq et al. (2014), who investigated the impact of recessions on CO2 
emissions in the European power sector from 2008 to 2009, argued that the lower demand for 
electricity during recessionary times was the most important factor in mitigating CO2 emissions. 
 Notwithstanding, these studies mix the short and the long-term implications of financial 
crises for the environment. For some, despite short-term reductions in emissions in crisis years, 
economic crises are typically not good for the environment. The main argument is that, contrary 
to what many would expect, recessions, by making access to capital more difficult, negatively 
affect emissions reduction efforts through their discouraging effects on investments (including 
investments in low-carbon technologies) (Del Río and Labandeira, 2009). As both governments 
and the private sector focus on the recovery and on adapting their respective budgets, are shifted 
away from climate policies. As a result, crises lead to postponement of environmental projects as 




or economy. Also, at a time of economic crisis, carbon lock-in is much more likely.7 Depressed 
aggregate demand, the fall in the prices of some goods and lower economic capacity encourage 
the consumption of goods with a lower environmental quality (typically cheaper) and to an over-
exploitation of resources with associated environmental degradation effects (Del Río and 
Labandeira, 2009). Additionally, lower energy prices during crises, reduce the economic viability 
of cleaner technologies. Governments are likely to avoid burdening businesses with extra costs 
and regulation at a time when the economy is fragile and jobs may be at risk (Wooders and 
Runnalls, 2008). Such scenarios also assume a low political will to implement climate policy in 
the short term and a reduced incentive to participate in international agreements to tackle the issue 
in the longer term.  
In contrast, another group of people advocate exactly the opposite that economic crises 
provide an opportunity for developing and investing in low-carbon technologies that, in turn, could 
provide a way out of the recession (Greenpeace, 2008). According to this view, given the long 
lifetime of most energy infrastructures and technologies, the opportunities provided by crises to 
replace carbon-intensive technologies by cleaner alternatives should not be missed. For 
Papandreou (2015), crises can open up opportunities for new institutional pathways if the forces 
they unleash or the rebalancing of conflicting political and economic interests give rise to changes 
in existing norms and institutions.8 Crises throw existing institutions, governance structures and 
 
7 Carbon lock-in refers to the difficulty to shift the economy and technological systems into a low-carbon path. 
Whereas traditional economic approaches emphasize the role of existing physical infrastructures and the long age of 
the capital stock in key sectors (energy production and transport), more recent “evolutionary” approaches consider a 
wide array of sources of carbon lock-in, including economic and non-economic barriers to changes in complex 
technological systems (Unruh, 2000; Marechal, 2007). 
8 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) provide a sweeping account of the development of nations over millennia and how 
different crises or historical contingencies were often turning points that could substantially alter the trajectory of a 




theories that legitimize them into new critical light.9 Given the greater competition on scarce 
resources and short-term priorities for the use of those resources, crises should strengthen the case 
for a suitable design of climate policies which lead to cost-effective emissions reductions in an 
intertemporal perspective. Proponents of this view call for clear, long-term and stable policy 
frameworks and more collaboration at the international level.  
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
 
We estimate and trace out the average evolution of emissions to different types of crises. The 
approach followed is the one by Jordà (2005). This approach to estimate impulse-response 
functions has been advocated by Auerbach and Gorodnichencko (2013) and Romer and Romer 
(2017)as a flexible alternative to vector autoregressions (autoregressive distributed lag models) 
since it does not impose dynamic restrictions. It is also suited to estimating nonlinearities in the 
dynamic response.  
The baseline specification takes the following form: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + θX𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡      (1) 
 
in which 𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 is the natural logarithm of an emissions variable (see section 4 for details) in country 
i in period t+k; 𝛼𝑖 are country fixed effects included to control for unobserved cross-country 
heterogeneity; 𝜇𝑡 are time effects to control to control for global shocks; 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is our financial crisis 
 
9 Geels (2013) frames the relationship between the financial crises and sustainability transitions within a multi-level 




variable, which takes value 0 in non-crisis years and 1 in crisis years. 𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡 takes the value of 1 for 
the starting year of a given financial crisis and 0 otherwise (we focus only on the first year of a 
given crisis episode to improve the identification and minimize reverse causality problems – as in 
Ball, Furceri, Leigh, Loungani, 2013). X𝑖,𝑡 is a set of controls including two lags of the dependent 
variable, two lags of the crisis variable and two lags of real GDP growth (these were chosen based 
on the Akaike information criterion, but adding more lags does not qualitatively change the thrust 
of the results). 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is an i.i.d. disturbance term satisfying standard assumptions of zero mean and 
constant variance. 
In the second specification, the dynamic response varies with the economic business cycle 
as follows: 
 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑘
𝐿𝐹(𝑧𝑖,𝑡)𝐹𝐶𝑖,𝑡+𝛽𝑘






,     𝛾 > 0 
 
in which 𝑧𝑖𝑡 is an indicator of the state of the economy normalized to have zero mean and unit 
variance. Following Auerbach and Gorodichenko (2012), the indicator of the state of the economy 
is the real GDP growth rate, and Fit is a smooth transition function used to estimate the 
environmental impact of crises in expansions versus recessions. They set 𝛾 = 1.5, which we also 
use. Our robustness exercises will include re-estimations based on an alternative measure of 
economic slack, namely the output gap computed via the recent Hamilton (2018) filter. M is the 




𝐹(𝑧𝑖,𝑡). Equations (1) and (2) are estimated using OLS for each k=0,..,6. Impulse response 
functions are computed using the estimated coefficients 𝛽𝑘, and the confidence bands associated 
with the estimated impulse-response functions are obtained using the estimated standard errors 
of the coefficients 𝛽𝑘, based on robust standard errors clustered at the country level. 
The specification given by equation (2) is equivalent to Granger and Terävistra´s (1993) 
smooth transition autoregressive model. Its advantage is twofold. First, compared with a model 
in which each dependent variable would be interacted with a measure of the business cycle 
position, it allows a direct test of whether the effect of crises varies across different regimes. 
Second, compared with estimating structural vector autoregressions for each regime it allows the 
effect of crises to change smoothly between good and bad times by considering a continuum of 
states to compute the impulse response functions, thus making the response more stable and 
precise. 
 
4. Data and Stylized Facts 
 
4.1 Emissions 
Data was aggregated by the World Resources Institute (WRI), which includes GHG emissions 
by gas and economic sectors. GHG emissions rely on a gas aggregation method that includes 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and non-CO2 emissions, such as methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), and 
fluorinated gases (F-gases), converted based on their 100-year Global Warming Potential (GWP-




Land-use and Land-use Change and Forestry (LULUCF) in our baseline results, given the 
discrepancies between FAO data and what countries report to the UNFCCC.10 
CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement manufacture are available from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) for 101 developing economies, the Carbon Dioxide 
Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) for 50 countries that lack IEA data (cover mostly cement 
production and up to 2011), and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (USEIA), which 
complements the CDIAC’s 2012 emissions for the 50 countries that lack IEA data.  
CH4 and N2O are taken from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US-EPA), which 
provides data on emissions from industrial processes and waste, and from the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), which includes data on agriculture emissions. Fluorinated gas emissions are 
provided by the US-EPA and fall within the industrial processes sector. 
Emissions by economic sector regroup agriculture, energy, industrial processes, and waste 
emissions. Agriculture emissions are made of CH4 and N2O (data from FAO) and energy 
emissions are composed of CO2 from fuel combustion (IEA) and of CH4 and N2O from fugitive 
emissions (US-EPA). Industrial processes include CO2 from cement production (CDIAC) and 
other related emissions (US-EPA), and waste emissions are produced by CH4 and N2O from 
landfills and human sewage (US-EPA). 
With the exception of CO2 for which we have longer time series – starting in 1980 – all 
other emission series begin in 1990. CO2 produces eight times less greenhouse effects than 
methane. However, with a focus on the concentration, among Carbone dioxide, methane and 
 
10  Our results are robust even with the inclusion of LULUCF - see the Appendix Figure A0. That said, Nitrous oxide 
and, to a large degree, methane are emitted by activities related to agriculture (we thank an anonymous referee for this 
comment). We estimated the baseline regression for financial crises adding up to two lags of the value-added in 
agriculture in percent of GDP (from the World Bank´s WDI) and while the IRF for nitrous oxide lost a bit of statistical 




nitrous oxide, the CO2 has the biggest impact on global warming. Moreover, whereby methane 
naturally breaks down relatively quickly in the atmosphere, the lifespan of CO2 exceeds the first 
one. As a result, in order to further inspect the relevance of financial crises in affecting CO2 
emissions, we resort to IEA categorization into CO2 stemming from electricity and gas, from 
manufacturing, from transportation and from other fuel combustion. These series also go back to 
1980. 
The previously described GHG emissions variable is what we will refer to as “production-
based” emissions. Now, to compute our “consumption-based” GHG emissions counterpart, we 
require a measure of emissions embodied in international trade. We use the Eora multi-region 
input-output (MRIO) database, which provides data on both production and consumption 
emissions. The database matches emissions with input output tables covering more than 15,000 
sectors and 170 countries of our original dataset. Production-based emissions are based on 
EDGAR (Emissions Database for Global Atmospheric Research) and FAO. EDGAR’s CO2, CH4, 
and N2O emissions are calculated based on the energy balance statistics of the IEA, which is the 
same source of emissions as for the WRI dataset, agriculture emissions follow FAO, and the 
remaining emissions combine alternative sources. In light of some differences in production 
emissions from Eora and our original emissions time series, we use the difference between Eora’s 
consumption and production emissions, capturing emissions derived from international trade and 
added it to our production-based emissions for each country and year. 
 
4.2 Financial Crises and Other Data 
Financial crisis dummies are retrieved from Leaven and Valencia’s (2010) publicly available 




currency crises and, finally, debt crises. These authors provide detailed information on the starting 
date of several types of crises. The dataset is constructed by combining quantitative indicators 
measuring e.g. banking sector distress, such as a sharp increase in nonperforming loans and bank 
runs, with a subjective assessment of the situation. The database documents many features of 
several banking crises episodes from 1980 to 2012, including details on the resolution policy 
interventions put in place to attenuate the distress of the banking sector. Their database extends 
and builds on the database of Caprio et al. (2005).  
As far as macroeconomic variables are concerned, real GDP (in national currency) and real 
GDP growth come from the IMFs World Economic Outlook (WEO) database, which covers 189 
countries starting in 1980. For robustness purposes, we also use an indicator of the fiscal stance 
based on government’s consumption forecasts errors, retrieved from the October vintage of the 
WEO forecasts. Actual data on government consumption correspond to the first release. Summary 
statistics for our panel of 55 developing countries are presented in the Appendix Table A.1. The 





Figure 1 plots the results obtained by estimating equation (1) for our six types of financial 
crises and for the four components of production-based GHG, namely CO2, N2O, CH4 and F-gas. 
Financial crises seem to lead to a statistically significant reduction in CO2 emissions. The fall in 
CO2 emissions is sizeable when non-systemic crises take place. Looking at different types of 




methane and fluorinated gas emissions react positively and significantly following debt crises and 
currency crises, respectively. Systemic crises also lead to a significant fall in fluorinated gas 
emissions. 
 
[insert Figure 1] 
 
 
Do production-based emissions behave differently from consumption-based ones? To 
provide an answer, equation (1) is re-estimated once more for these two dependent variables 
separately. Results are shown in Figure 2: systemic crises lead to a positive and statistically 
significant response from consumption-based emissions which suggests that this type of crises 
encourages the consumption of goods with a lower environmental quality. In contrast, production-
based emissions increase following debt crises. All other crises lead to statistically insignificant 
results as evidenced by confidence bands above and below zero. 
 
 
[insert Figure 2] 
 
 
From this point onwards, only those IRFs yielding statistically significant results are shown 
for reasons of parsimony (the full set of results is available from the authors upon request). The 
previous set of unconditional results mask, however, considerable variation depending on business 
cycle conditions, as shown by the estimation of equation (2) reported in Figure 3.  
During periods of slack, financial crises in general seem to have a positive and statistically 




for methane. Systemic crises that hit a country undergoing economic difficulties are associated 
with larger CO2 and both production-based and consumption-based GHG emissions. As for the 
type of financial crisis that seems to have larger impacts, debt crises are associated with increases 
in production-based GHG emissions irrespectively of the phase of the business cycle.  Also, 
methane, F-gas and nitrous oxide react positively in the short to medium-run following debt crises 
that take place during bad economic times. Under strong economic conditions however, the effects 
tend to be negative but are most of the times not very precisely estimated. 
We also redid the previous analysis by focusing instead on economic sectors instead of gas 
nature. Such results are displayed in Figure A1 in the Appendix. They show that when hit by a 
debt crisis, a country experiences a rise in emissions stemming from either energy related activities 
or industrial processes. These effects are potentially large in the medium term and statistically 
different from zero. In addition, relying on longer CO2 series, Figure A2 shows that carbon dioxide 
emissions emanating from manufacturing (transportation) decrease (increase) following a 
financial/banking (systemic) crisis. CO2 stemming from other fuel combustion reacts positively 
and statistically significantly following a systemic or debt crisis. 
 
[insert Figure 3] 
 
Next, we split between emerging markets and low-income countries. Re-estimating 
equation (1) separately for each sub-sample yields the results displayed in Figures 4 and 5. In 
Figure 4, we observe that financial (debt) crises result in a fall in CO2 (production-based GHG) 
emissions in emerging market economies in normal times. When we condition by the state of the 




emissions from CO2 and production based GHG during periods of economic slack, but they tend 
to decline during booms (despite this effect being less precisely estimated on average). Evidence 
seems to suggest that in bad times, emerging market economies do not take that opportunity to get 
away from carbon-intensive technologies and invest in cleaner ones, contrary to Papandreou’s 
(2015) argument. In Figure 5, the unconditional results for low-income countries show positive 
(negative) and statistically significant response of methane following banking (currency) crises. 
Estimating equation 2 for the subsample of low-income countries (not shown for reasons of 
parsimony) shows a rise (fall) in methane emissions during bad times following banking and debt 
(systemic) crises. In periods of strong economic conditions, most IRFs are not statistically different 
from zero (except the negative association between methane emissions and debt crises). 
 
[insert Figure 4] 
[insert Figure 5] 
 
b. Sensitivity and Robustness checks 
Sensitivity 
A possible bias from estimating equation (1) using country-fixed effects is that the error term 
may have a non-zero expected value, due to the interaction of fixed effects and country-specific 
developments (Tuelings and Zubanov, 2010). This would lead to a bias of the estimates that is a 
function of k. To address this issue, equation (1) was re-estimated by excluding country fixed 





As an additional sensitivity check, equation (1) was re-estimated for different lags (l) of the 
variables in the X vector. Results for zero lags, one lag and three lags (not shown but available 
upon request) confirm that previous findings are not sensitive to the choice of the number of lags. 
Robustness to the identification of slack 
We employed an output gap measure as an alternative proxy to measure the economic slack 
entering the function 𝐹(𝑧𝑖𝑡) that is present in equation (2). There isn’t a widely accepted approach 
to calculate potential output. Two alternative approaches are typically used (Borio, 2013): i) there 
are univariate statistical approaches, which consist of filtering out the trend component from the 
cyclical one; ii) there are the structural approaches, which derive the estimates directly from the 
theoretical structure of a model. Aware of the shortcomings of using either one or the other, we 
apply the recent filtering technique developed by Hamilton (2018).We are also mindful of the 
criticisms surrounding the popular use of the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter (such as the 
identification of spurious cycles) in the context of a very large heterogeneous sample (Harvey and 
Jaeger, 1993; Cogley and Nason, 1995). Hamilton’s (2018) method to extract the cyclical and trend 
component of a generic variable tx  (denoted t
cx  and tx
 , respectively), consists of estimating the 
following:  
𝑥𝑡+ℎ = 𝛾0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 + 𝑥𝑡−𝑗 + 𝑢𝑡+ℎ
𝑘






The non-stationary part of the regression provides the cyclical component: 
𝑥𝑡
𝑐 = 𝑢?̂?  (4) 





𝜏 = 𝛾0̂ + ∑ 𝛾?̂? + 𝑥𝑡−ℎ−𝑗
𝑘
𝑗=0   (5) 
Hamilton (2018) suggests that h and k should be chosen such that the residuals from equation 
(3) are stationary and points out that, for a broad array of processes, the fourth differences of a 
series are indeed stationary. We choose h = 2 and k = 3, which is line with the dynamics seen in 
real GDP. Results of re-estimating equation 2 using the newly computed output gap as measure of 
slack, are displayed in Figure A3 in the Appendix. We can see that while there are some 
similarities, there are also some insightful differences with respect to the IRFs presented in Figure 
3. CO2 emissions decline in times of economic strain after a financial crisis (particularly non-
systemic and banking ones). Moreover, production-based GHG emissions always reactive 
positively and significantly following a debt crisis irrespectively of the state of the economy. 
Finally, methane and nitrous oxide emissions increase after a debt crisis that hits the economic 
during periods of slack. 
Does the prevailing fiscal stance matter? 
The response of emissions to financial crises may also depend on whether the government is 
engaging in expansionary or contractionary fiscal policy at the time the economy is hit. To our 
knowledge, the only paper relating fiscal policy and the environment is the one by Lopez, Galinato 
and Islam (2011). The authors model (and empirically test) the impact of fiscal spending patterns 
on the environment and find that there is a reallocation of government spending composition 
towards social and public goods that tend to reduce pollution when an economy is hit by a negative 
shock. They further conclude that increasing total government spending (that is, engaging in 




while our setting is not identical, we still aim to shed further light into the effects of crises on the 
environment conditioning on prevailing (at the time of the shock) fiscal conditions. 
We consider an alternative version of equation (2) where instead of the state of the economy, 
we use an indicator of fiscal policy stance. The fiscal policy stance indicator is a government 
consumption shock, identified as the forecast error of government consumption expenditure 
relative to GDP (for a similar approach see Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012, 2013; Abiad, 
Furceri, and Topalova 2015).11 Here, δ = 1 is used to assess the role of the fiscal policy.12 Figure 6 
shows the results. Financial crises hitting an economy when it is engaging in contractionary fiscal 
policies, leads to a negative and statistically significant response of CO2 emissions. In contrast, 
after systemic (non-systemic) crises that take place in periods of fiscal relaxation, production-
based GHG (CO2) emissions go up (down) in the medium term. Furthermore, CO2 emissions react 
positively (negatively) after a banking or debt crisis concomitant with a loosening (tightening) of 
the fiscal stance. Finally, currency crises that take place at times of fiscal retrenchment lead to a 
fall in both CO2 and production based GHG emissions. 
[insert Figure 6] 
 
6. Conclusion  
This paper provided empirical evidence on the impact of different types of financial crises on 
emissions in a panel of 55 countries from 1980 until 2012. Methodologically, we estimated 
 
11 This procedure also overcomes the problem of fiscal foresight (Forni and Gambetti 2010; Leeper et al., 2013; Ben 
Zeev and Pappa 2014), because it aligns the economic agents’ and the econometrician’s information sets. 




impulse response functions of a variety of emissions categories to financial crises using Jorda´s 
(2005) local projection method. 
We found that financial crises are associated with a statistically significant reduction in 
CO2 emissions. CO2 emissions also respond negatively and significantly following banking 
crises, while methane and fluorinated gas emissions react positively and significantly following 
debt crises and currency crises, respectively. Evidence points to the fact that systemic crises seem 
to lead to a positive and statistically significant response from consumption-based emissions, 
suggesting that this type of crises encouraged the consumption of goods with a lower 
environmental quality. In contrast, production-based emissions rose following debt crises. 
Furthermore, a country experiences a rise in emissions stemming from either energy related 
activities or industrial processes when hit by a debt crisis.CO2 emissions emanating from 
manufacturing (transportation) decrease (increase) following a financial/banking (systemic) crisis. 
During bad times, financial crises in general had a positive and statistically significant impact on 
both methane and nitrous oxide emissions. In contrast, during good times, the effects tend to be 
negative but are most of the times not very precisely estimated. If a financial crisis hit an economy 
when it is consolidating its public finances, this led to a negative and statistically significant 
response of CO2 emissions. After systemic (non-systemic) crises that take place in periods of fiscal 
relaxation, production-based GHG (CO2) emissions go up (down) in the medium term. Finally, 
currency crises that take place at times of fiscal retrenchment lead to a fall in both CO2 and 
production based GHG emissions. 
For policy makers, it is important so see financial crises as opportunities to make big reductions 




nudge us all toward innovations that, in turn, give the tools to be a low carbon society, with a 
business model that combines prosperity with responsibility. 
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LIST OF COUNTRIES 
Turkey, South Africa, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Haiti, Honduras Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Lao P.D.R., 
Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Rep., Congo, Dem. 
Rep., Ethiopia, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Kazakhstan, Bulgaria, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, China, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania 
 
Table A1. Summary Statistics, developing countries 
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max 
financial crises 1540 0.101 0.300 0 1 
systemic crises 1540 0.044 0.206 0 1 
non-systemic crises 1540 0.192 0.394 0 1 
banking crises 1540 0.038 0.193 0 1 
currency crises 1540 0.051 0.221 0 1 
debt crises 1540 0.021 0.142 0 1 
real GDP growth 2939 2.971 6.422 -69.70 53.810 
CO2 3431 91.378 449.111 0.018 9019.518 
production based GHG 2643 163.631 672.239 0.035 10975.5 
consumption based GHG 2503 140.713 562.701 0.01 9337.216 
CH4 2611 38.518 102.825 0.011 914.002 
N2O 2611 15.684 45.919 0.002 572.44 
F-gas 2645 1.604 10.19 0 182.314 
emissions from energy 1993 154.015 600.817 0.742 8649.794 
emissions from industrial processes 2538 9.379 61.880 0 1296.546 
emissions from agriculture 2611 30.955 89.666 0.005 844.54 
emissions from waste 2645 7.259 20.919 0.003 197.6 
CO2 from electricity and heat 2697 52.852 249.470 0 4404.92 
CO2 from manufacturing 2697 30.990 157.860 0 2546.06 
CO2 from transportation 2697 16.073 44.867 0.04 702.91 
CO2 from other fuel combustion 2697 14.604 53.228 0 551.97 





Table A2. List (years) of Crises by type (from Laeven and Valencia, 2010 updated) 
Country  Financial crisis Systemic 
crisis 
Non-systemic crisis Banking crisis Currency crisis Debt 
crisis 
Turkey 1982, 1984, 1991, 1996, 
2000, 2001 
 1982, 1984, 2000, 2001 1982, 2000 1984, 1991, 
1996, 2001 
 
South Africa 1984, 1985    1984 1985 
Argentina 1980, 1981, 1982, 1987, 
1989, 1995, 2001, 2002 
 1980, 1981, 1982, 1989, 







Bolivia 1980, 1981, 1986, 1994  1986, 1994 1986, 1994 1981 1980 
Brazil 1982, 1983, 1987, 1990, 
1992, 1994, 1999 
 190, 1994, 1999 1990, 1994 1982, 1987, 
1992, 1999 
1983 
Chile 1981, 1982, 1983  1981, 1982, 1983 1981 1982 1983 
Colombia 1982, 1985, 1998  1982, 1985 1982, 1998 1985  
Haiti 1992, 1994, 2003   1994 1992, 2003  
Honduras 1981, 1990    1990 1981 
Mexico 1981, 1982, 1994, 1995  1981, 1982, 1994, 1995 1981, 1994 1982, 1995 1982 
Nicaragua 1980, 1985, 1990, 2000  1990, 2000 1990, 2000 1985, 1990 1980 
Peru 1981, 1983, 1988  1983, 1988 1983 1981 1988 
Jordan 1989 1989  1989 1989 1989 
Egypt 1980, 1984, 1990  1980, 1984 1980 1990 1984 
Yemen 1985, 1995, 1996  1996,  1996 1985, 1995  
Bangladesh 1987   1987   
Cambodia 1992    1992  
India 1993 1993  1993   
Indonesia 1997, 1998, 1999  1997, 1998, 1999 1997 1998 1999 
Laos 1986, 1997 1997   1986, 1997  
Nepal 1984, 1988, 1992  1988 1988 1984, 1992  
Philippines 1983, 1997, 1998  1983, 1998 1983, 1997 1983 1983 
Thailand 1983, 1997, 1998  1983, 1997, 1998 1983, 1997 1998  
Vietnam 1981, 1985, 1987, 1997    1981, 1987 1985 
Cameroon 1987, 1989, 1994, 1995  1987, 1989, 1995 1987, 1995 1994 1989 
Chad 1983, 1992, 1994  1983, 1992 1983, 1992 1994  
Congo 1983, 1986, 1989, 1991, 
1992, 1994, 1999 
 1983, 1986, 1989, 1991, 






Ethiopia 1993    1993  
Ghana 1982, 1983, 1993, 2000  1982, 1983 1982 1983, 1993, 
2000 
 
Cote Ivoire 1984, 1988, 1994, 2001  1988 1988 1994 1984, 
2001 
Kenya 1985, 1992, 1993  1985, 1992, 1993 1985, 1992 1993  
Madagascar 1981, 1984, 1988, 1994, 
2004 
 1988 1988 1984, 1994, 
2001 
1981 
Mali 1987, 1994  1987 1987 1994  
Morocco 1980, 1981, 1983  1980, 1981, 1983 1980 1981 1983 
Mozambique 1984, 1987  1987 1987 1987 1984 
Nigeria 1983, 1989, 1991  1991 1991 1983, 1989 1983 
Sudan 1981, 1988, 1994    1981, 1988, 
1994 
 
Tanzania 1984, 1985, 1987, 1990  1987, 1990 1987 1985 1984 
Uganda 1980, 1981, 1988, 1994  1994 1994 1980, 1988 1981 
Burkina 
Faso 
1990, 1994  1990, 1994 1990 1994  
Zambia 1983, 1989, 1995, 1996  1995 1995 1983, 1989, 
1995 
1983 
Kazakhstan 1999    1999  
Bulgaria 1990, 1996  1996 1996 1996 1990 
Moldova 1999, 2002    1999 2002 
Russia 1998  1998 1998 1998 1998 
Tajikistan 1999 1999   1999  
China 1998  1998 1998   
Ukraine 1998  1998 1998 1998 1998 
Uzbekistan 1994, 2000    1994, 2000  
Lithuania 1992, 1995  1995 1995  1992 
Poland 1981, 1992  1992 1992  1981 
Romania 1982, 1990, 1996  1990, 1996 1990 1996 1982 
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